We discuss a long code problem in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 ͑BB84͒ quantum-key-distribution protocol and describe how it can be overcome by concatenation of the protocol. Observing that concatenated modified Lo-Chau protocol finally reduces to the concatenated BB84 protocol, we give the unconditional security of the concatenated BB84 protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information processing with quantum systems enables what seems to be impossible with its classical counterpart ͓1-5͔.
Quantum key distribution ͑QKD͒ ͓6-9͔ is one of the most interesting and important quantum information processing protocols. QKD seems to have become the first practical quantum information processor ͓10͔. Although security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 ͑BB84͒ QKD ͓6͔ had been widely conjectured based on the no-cloning theorem ͓11,12͔, it is quite recently that its unconditional security was shown ͓13-15͔. In particular, Shor and Preskill ͓15͔ showed the security of BB84 scheme by elegantly using the connections among several basic ideas in quantum information processing protocols, i.e., quantum error correcting codes ͑QECCs͒ ͓16,17͔ and entanglement purification ͓18͔.
A. Long code problem and concatenated BB84 protocol
The Shor-Preskill proof affords security for a certain type of BB84 protocol ͓15͔ where we perform error correction and privacy amplification by a classical code associated with Calderbank-Shor-Steane ͑CSS͒ quantum code ͓16,17,19͔. For a chosen code and a given error rate of the communication channels, Alice ͑the sender͒ and Bob ͑the receiver͒ can calculate Eve's ͑eavesdropper's͒ information on the final key. What Alice and Bob would want is to make Eve's information on the whole final key less than what they regard as negligible, for example, 1 bit. This can be done by choosing an appropriate code for the given error rate.
However, the Shor-Preskill proof does not place any bounds on the amount of effort Alice and Bob must put in decoding the classical error-correcting code associated with the CSS code ͓19͔. In particular, when the code length is large, the decoding is not so simple ͓15͔. One might say that we need not worry about the problem so much because we can do it by a code with a moderate length. However, we can easily see that it is risky. Let us consider a case where the number of bits is n and the error rate is r(0рrр1). Then the probability distribution of the error rate will be peaked at r with standard deviation ϳͱr(1Ϫr)/n. When the number of bits n is one thousand and the error rate r is 10%, the standard deviation is about 0.949%. This means that the probability that the real error rate will be more than 12.4% (ϭrϩ2.57) is 1%. This implies that if they had assumed that a channel with 10% error rate is below a threshold, say 12.4%, for the one thousand bits, then the probability that Alice and Bob will be cheated is 1%. Note that this is too high a risk for a cryptographic task where we must achieve an exponentially small probability to be cheated. Thus, they have to permit a large room, say 20, between the error rates of the channel and the threshold. Then the threshold must be larger than 29.0% in this case. However, no code is found to work yet if it exceeds 26.4% ͓20͔. Therefore, the number of bits n must be large, say 10 6 , in order to obtain the exponential security. However, as noted previously, decoding such a long code might be a difficult task ͓15͔.
On the other hand, concatenation is a very useful and interesting idea in both classical and quantum error corrections ͓21͔. In this method, already-encoded bits are used as unit bits to encode new bits. The iterative processes can be repeated as we like. The more they perform the concatenation processes, the shorter the encoded bits become exponentially. Since the concatenated codes are not included in the orginal codes, it is nontrivial to adopt the concatenated codes for certain tasks. For example, it is by using concatenated coding that the fault tolerant quantum computation becomes possible ͓22͔.
In this paper, we show that the long code problem can be avoided by the idea of using concatenated BB84 protocol. First, Alice and Bob generate raw keys. Next, using a classical code associated with CSS code they perform error correction and privacy amplification on the raw keys, as prescribed in Ref. ͓15͔ . As a result they get the first key. The first key is not so much secure ͑possibly due to the long code *Present address: Department of Electrical and Computer problem͒. They perform the error correction and privacy amplification again in the same way on the first key and then they obtain the second key. They repeat this process until the estimated leaked information on the final key is negligible.
In Sec. II, first we give the concatenated modified LoChau protocol. This protocol reduces to the concatenated CSS code protocol that reduces to the concatenated BB84 protocol. In Sec. III, we discuss the security of the concatenated schemes and how the concatenated protocol solves the long code problem. In Sec. IV, we give discussion and conclusion.
B. Notation
In this paper, we use mostly the notations used in Refs. ͓15,23͔.
The canonical basis of a qubit consists of ͉0͘ and ͉1͘. We define another basis as follows. ͉0 ͘ϭ(1/ ͱ2)(͉0 ͘ϩ͉1͘) and 
II. CONCATENATED BB84 PROTOCOL
First, we give the concatenated modified Lo-Chau protocol. This scheme reduces to the concatenated CSS codes protocol that reduces to the concatenated BB84 protocol.
We consider a doubly concatenated scheme of the ͓͓n 1 ,k 1 ,d 1 ͔͔ and ͓͓n 2 ,k 2 ,d 2 ͔͔ CSS codes ͓16,17͔. It is clear that it can be generalized to multiple concatenation in the same way. ͑3͒ Alice sends the second half of each EPR pair to Bob.
͑4͒ Bob receives the qubits and publically announces this fact.
͑5͒ Alice announces the bit string b. ͑6͒ Bob undoes the Hadamard operations in step ͑2͒. ͑7͒ Alice selects randomly n 1 n 2 of the 2n 1 n 2 EPR pairs to serve as check bits.
͑8͒ Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the n 1 n 2 check EPR pairs in the ͕͉0͘,͉1͖͘ basis and share the results.
If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort the scheme. ͑9͒ Alice randomly chooses n 1 unencoded qubits. She repeats this until all code bits are used. As a result, she gets n 2 sets of code bits whose number of elements is all n 1 . She announces her choices to Bob.
͑10͒ For each set, they make the measurements of z [r] for each row rH 1 and x
[r] for each row rH 2 of the ͓͓n 1 ,k 1 ,d 1 ͔͔ CSS code. Alice and Bob share the results, compute the syndromes for bit and phase flips, and then transforms their state so as to obtain k 1 n 2 once-encoded high-fidelity EPR pairs.
In the next stage, Alice and Bob do essentially the same operations on the k 1 n 2 once-encoded EPR pairs, as they have done on unencoded EPR pairs in the previous stage.
The second stage
͑1͒ Alice randomly chooses n 2 once-encoded qubits. She repeats this until all code bits are used. As a result, there are k 1 sets whose number of elements is n 2 . She announces her choice to Bob.
͑2͒ For each set, Alice and Bob make the measurements of z [r] for each row rH 1 and x [r] for each row rH 2 of the ͓͓n 2 ,k 2 ,d 2 ͔͔ CSS code. They share the results, compute the syndromes for bit and phase flips, and then transforms their state so as to obtain k 1 k 2 doubly encoded EPR pairs.
͑3͒ Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in the doubly encoded ͕͉0͘,͉1͖͘ basis to obtain k 1 k 2 -bit final key.
Let us now consider reduction of the protocol. The same arguments used in Ref. ͓15͔ apply here. The difference is that they measure the syndrome twice at both levels of concatenation, that is, unencoded qubits and once-encoded qubits.
B. Protocol B: Concatenated CSS code protocol

The first stage
͑1͒ Alice creates n 1 n 2 random check bits and a random (2n 1 n 2 )-bit string b.
͑2͒ Alice chooses n 2 n 1 -bit string x i and z i at random (i ϭ1,2, . . . ,n 2 ).
͑3͒ Alice prepares k 1 n 2 once-encoded bits in a state ͉00
•••0͘ using ͓͓n 1 ,k 1 ,d 1 ͔͔ CSS code Q x i ,z i .
The second stage
͑1͒ Alice creates a random k 1 k 2 -bit key string kЈ. ͑2͒ Alice chooses k 1 n 2 -bit string x j Ј and z j Ј at random ( jϭ1,2, . . . ,k 1 ). ͑3͒ Alice encodes her key ͉kЈ͘ using the once-encoded qubits prepared in step ͑3͒ of the first stage with the
͑4͒ Alice randomly chooses n 1 n 2 positions out of 2n 1 n 2 and puts the unencoded check bits in these positions. She randomly permutes the qubits of the doubly encoded code bits of the previous step. She puts them in the remaining positions.
͑5͒ Alice performs the Hadamard operation on each qubit for which the component of b is 1.
͑6͒ Alice sends the resulting state to Bob. Bob acknowledges the receipt of the qubits.
͑7͒ Alice announces the string b, the positions and values of unencoded check bits, the random permutation, and each x i , z i and x j Ј , z j Ј .
͑8͒ Bob undoes the Hadamard operation and random permutation.
͑9͒ Bob measures unencoded check bits in the ͕͉0͘,͉1͖͘
basis and announces the results to Alice. If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort the scheme.
͑10͒ Bob measures the qubits in the doubly encoded ͕͉0͘,͉1͖͘ basis to obtain k 1 k 2 -bit final key with near-perfect security.
Let us consider reduction of the concatenated CSS code protocol to the concatenated BB84 protocol. We can apply the same arguments used in Ref. ͑3͒ Alice sends the resulting qubits to Bob. ͑4͒ Bob receives the 4n 1 n 2 (1ϩ␦) qubits, measuring each in the ͕͉0͘,͉1͖͘ and ͕͉0 ͘,͉1 ͖͘ basis at random.
͑5͒ Alice announces b. ͑6͒ Bob discards any results where he measured a different basis than Alice prepared. With high probability, there are at least 2n 1 n 2 bits left. Alice decides randomly on a set of 2n 1 n 2 bits to use for the protocol and chooses at random n 1 n 2 of these to be check bits.
͑7͒ Alice and Bob announce the values of their check bits. If very few of these values agree, they abort the protocol.
͑8͒ Alice announces uϩv, where v is a string consisting of randomly chosen code bits, and u is a random code word in C 1 of the ͓͓n 1 ,k 1 ,d 1 ͔͔ code. Alice announces the n 1 positions of the randomly chosen code bits.
͑9͒ Repeat the previous step n 2 times, until all code bits are consumed.
͑10͒ Bob subtracts each uϩv from each of his code bits, vϩ⑀, and corrects the result, uϩ⑀, to a code word in C 1 of the ͓͓n 1 ,k 1 ,d 1 ͔͔ code.
͑11͒ Alice and Bob use the coset of each uϩC 2 as the key. In this way, they obtain k 1 n 2 -bit string.
The second stage
͑1͒ Alice announces uϩv, where v is a string consisting of randomly chosen code bits, and u is a random code word in C 2 of the ͓͓n 2 ,k 2 ,d 2 ͔͔ code. Alice announces the n 2 positions of the randomly chosen code bits.
͑2͒ Repeat the previous step at k 1 times, until all code bits are consumed.
͑3͒ Bob subtracts each uϩv from his each code qubits, vϩ⑀, and corrects the result, uϩ⑀, to a code word in C 1 of the ͓͓n 2 ,k 2 ,d 2 ͔͔ code.
͑4͒ Alice and Bob use the coset of each uϩC 2 as the key. In this way, they obtain the k 1 k 2 -bit key.
III. SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
What we want to show is the security of protocol C, the cancatenated BB84 protocol. However, it is sufficient for us to show the security of protocol A, since protocol A reduces to protocol C. Accordingly, arguments in the following are for protocol A that accompanies entanglement purification.
The security of modified Lo-Chau protocol is based on the idea of random sampling ͓15,24͔: Based on the measured error rate in the check bits, Alice and Bob estimate actual error rate in the code bits. Since the check bits are randomly chosen, they can do it with a high reliability. Thus, they can correct errors with a high reliability. ͑It is not misleading to use notations of QECCs in the discussion of entanglement purification because they are equivalent here.͒ It is not difficult to intuitively understand how protocol A is secure. When the estimated actual error rate in the code bits is not low enough, they cannot obtain EPR pairs with a fidelity that is satisfactorily high. However, in most cases the fidelity has become higher. By iterating the entanglement purification, they can make the fidelity become higher and higher. Protocol A is secure when EPR pairs have high enough fidelity, since the almost perfect fidelity implies the almost perfect security ͓25,15͔. This is indeed the original idea of quantum privacy amplification ͓26͔.
Let us give a more detailed description. The probability distribution of the number of actual errors forms an approximate Gaussian distribution whose deviation depends on the length of the code. The longer the code is, the smaller the deviation. A rigorous relevant equation regarding random sampling for this estimation is given in Ref. ͓24͔. Let us consider the example considered in Introduction. The error rate r is 10%. The number of code-bits n is one thousand and thus the standard deviation is about 0.949%. This means that the probability that the real error rate will be less than 12.4% (ϭrϩ2.57) is 99%. Therefore, if the threshold of the error correcting code is greater than 12.4%, the error rate of purified EPR pairs will be less than 1%, which is much smaller than the original error rate, 10%. By repeating this operation, the fidelity can be made arbitrarily small. Let us estimate how error rate r decreases with iteration of purification. For a given length of code n, the deviation is approximately proportional to ͱr. ͑See Introduction.͒ Let us denote ith error rate and deviation by r i and i , respectively, where i is positive integer. Then we can get a relation r iϩ1 ϳexp(ϪT 2 / i 2 )ϭexp(ϪT 2 /r i ) when rϳ0. Here constant T is the threshold of the code. We can see that ith error rate r i superexponentially decreases with respect to i. Fidelity is proportional to 1Ϫr and thus almost perfect fidelity can be obtained.
In protocol A, Alice randomly chooses sets of qubits to be used for syndrome measurement. This corresponds to random choice of code bits to be used for error correction and privacy amplification ͓in step ͑8͒ of the first stage and step ͑1͒ of the second stage͔ in Protocol C. It should be noted that the randomness in the choice is essential in the proposed protocol: the error rate is what is averaged for all n 1 n 2 check bits. Unless the choice for the code bits is random, Eve can succesfully cheat by correlating positions of the errors in the code bits.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a certain class of BB84 protocol with proven security ͓15͔, long classical error correcting codes are desired in order to obtain sufficient security. However, it is not easy to decode long codes. If they use intermediate length codes, they cannot obtain enough security. We have shown that this long code problem can be resolved by concatenation of the BB84 protocol. We have shown the security of the concatenated BB84 protocol: the concatenated BB84 protocol can be derived from the concatenated modified Lo-Chau protocol. We have described how the latter protocol is secure.
